The literature which examines the impact of school spending on students' subsequent earnings is bifurcated into state-level studies, which typically find strong effects, and school-level studies,which find little effect. Since most of the school-level studies examine young workers, one explanation for the discrepancy is that school inputs benefit workers only as they gain job experience. The paper tests the hypothesis by using both school-level (NLSY) and state-level data sources (Census and the Biennial Survey of Education). Both data-sets suggest that there is typically no significant age dependence. Thus other explanations of the discrepancy are likely to explain the differing results.
Introduction
Education is arguably one of the best long term public investments available to a society. It is widely accepted that the private returns to an additional year of education are quite high, and that the social returns are also high. Such beliefs form the basis of government aid programs such as Pell grants, which are designed to encourage workers who could not otherwise afford college to attend. Recently, interest has been rekindled in an equally important question: would increased spending on public school resources represent an equally good or even better investment? In other words, should educational subsidies be shifted from the extensive margin (years of education) to the intensive margin (resources per student, holding constant years of schooling)?
Studies of the impact of school spending on earnings of students once they graduate date back to early work by Welch (1966) and Morgan and Sirageldin (1968) .
Betts (forthcoming) provides a survey of 23 contributions to this literature. The survey reveals a very mixed picture, with some papers finding strong effects of school spending on students' subsequent earnings, and many others finding little or no effect.
Betts reports three strong patterns in the literature: 1) Research which finds no or little effect of school resources in most cases uses earnings of workers when they are 32 years old or younger.
2) Such papers tend to measure school inputs for the school actually attended. 1 1 Examples include Betts (1995) and Grogger (1996) . Both the level of significance and the elasticities of earnings with respect to school resources are relatively low in these studies. In contrast, papers which find a strong positive effect of school resources on earnings measure earnings of workers who are between 20 and 60 in age, while typically using average school resources by state of birth as a proxy for school quality. Recent examples include Card and Krueger (1992a,b) and Rizzuto and Wachtel (1980). 3) Most of the papers which find no link between school spending and earnings examine workers educated in the last thirty years, as opposed to the first half of the century in the case of most state-level studies. (Betts, forthcoming) The disparity between these two literatures may derive from the fact that schoollevel studies use earnings of workers at a fairly young age. For workers recently out of school, unobserved training activities may lower workers' wages while increasing their lifecycle income. In addition, students who attend better public schools may obtain better training once into the work force, so that the impact of school resources on earnings might increase with age. On the other hand, some existing evidence suggests that the returns to education may decrease with age.
The goal of this paper is to test the hypothesis that school resources affect the earnings of workers only after the workers have gained substantial experience in the labor market. This question is important for two reasons. First, it may help to reconcile the state-level and school-level literatures. Second, age dependency would greatly affect the overall rate of return to school spending. Suppose that school spending increases students' earnings, but only later in life, once workers enter their thirties or forties. In this case, existing estimates of the internal rate of return to school spending would be too high.
For instance, Betts (forthcoming) examines the average elasticity of white male's earnings with respect to class size from the state-level literature. He obtains an internal rate of return to school spending of 2.35%. Repeating these calculations under the assumption that the elasticity in the state-level research is correct, but that it applies to workers only once they reach the age of 30, reduces the internal rate of return to just 1.55%. 2 Since the school-level and state-level data-sets have yielded such different conclusions, this paper examines both types of data. First, it re-analyzes the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) subsample of young white males used by Betts (1995) . It tests whether school resources at the actual school attended are significantly related to the predicted mid-life earnings of these workers. These mid-career earnings are predicted using the three digit occupation which the worker reported in 1989, when workers in the sample ranged in age from 24 to 32. It also models predicted wage growth and occupational status. Second, the paper re-analyzes the Census data used by authors such as Card and Krueger (1992a) , to test for age dependence in the link between statelevel school resources and workers' earnings. To distinguish between age dependence and cohort effects, the paper also analyzes pooled 1970 and 1980 Census data. Unlike earlier work, this section groups workers into five-year birth cohorts, and includes workers who were aged between 20 and 59.
The next section documents the fact that most of the studies which show no effect of school resources on earnings examine workers who are under 30. The section then develops a simple human capital model to demonstrate that theory predicts that the impact of school resources on earnings could rise or fall with the worker's age. The question of whether the impact of school spending on earnings depends on age is thus subject to empirical resolution. Sections 3 and 4 detail the results.
2 Section 3 of the paper describes the method used to calculate internal rates of return from elasticities of earnings with respect to class size. Figure 1 illustrates the possibility that the link between public school spending and earnings of workers after they leave school is age dependent. Each of the studies surveyed by Betts (forthcoming) is plotted against the ages at which workers' earnings are observed. The patterns of each bar indicate whether the given paper finds that school inputs are statistically significant, of mixed significance or insignificant in models of earnings. (These allocations are taken from the aforementioned paper, in which for each measure of school resources, such as spending per pupil and class size, the percentage of reported regressions in which the school input was significant at 5% was calculated. The mean of these percentages across all measures of school inputs used by the given paper was taken. Papers were assigned to the top and bottom levels of statistical significance based on whether this average percentage was above 66.6% or below 33.3% respectively.) 3 4 5
Wage-Experience Profiles and the Returns to School Inputs
The figure makes clear how age dependence in the school input:earnings relation could reconcile the disparate results in the literature. With one exception, the school-level studies, in the top box of the figure, focus mainly on workers under 30. State-level studies, in the bottom box, in all cases draw most of their sample from workers over 30.
The district-level studies, in the center box, span a wide range of age groups. Apart from a series of three papers by Link and co-authors which examine the same sample of workers from the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men in three successive years, the district-level studies of workers under thirty find little or no significant effect of school resources on earnings.
Before examining the question of age dependence empirically, it is worthwhile to examine the predictions of human capital theory on this score. Consider a simple model in which workers acquire education and training, in that order, with a view to maximizing the present value of lifetime earnings. Assume that wages depend on educational attainment E and training TR, with (possibly negative) earnings accruing in periods in which workers are in school or training: 
Educational attainment E is a function of years of schooling finished by the start of period t, ED t , and the average quality of schooling, Q, during time spent in school: 
Taking the first-order conditions with respect to ED and TR, totally differentiating the resulting equations, and applying Cramer's rule, the result emerges that a higher level of school quality may induce students to acquire either more or less training than they would had they attended schools of lower quality. The intuition is that although higher school quality is likely to increase the marginal benefits of subsequent training, it also increases the marginal cost. That is, the wages foregone during training will be higher for a person who attended a better school.
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Differences in the amount of unobserved training between workers represent an important potential explanation for why the impact of school resources could be age dependent. If a worker obtains training while he is young, his wages will be low, but they will rise in line with productivity after training is finished.
If workers who attended better schools acquire less training (due to higher marginal costs by way of higher opportunity costs), then the impact of higher school quality will be most noticeable among younger workers. That is, young workers who attended schools of lower quality will spend more time training when young. Since workers who are taking training earn an amount I TR which is less than the wage of identical workers who are not training, the gap in wages between those who attended 6 Similarly, the impact of an increase in school quality on educational attainment is uncertain. A full derivation of these results is available from the author.
worse and better schools will be widest while the former are still taking on-the-job training and earning lower wages. After the workers who attended the worse schools have finished training, their wages increase to reflect their newly acquired human capital. This wage hike reduces the gap in earnings between those who attended different strata of schools.
In the opposite and equally plausible case, the workers who attended the better schools might choose more training, in which case the observed returns to school quality would increase with the workers' age.
Further uncertainty is introduced by the fact that the impact of school quality on years of schooling chosen by each worker is uncertain. What if schooling acts as a signal rather than as a means of acquiring new skills?
In this context, Farber and Gibbons (1991) show that if schooling is observable to the employer, then any changes in wages with years of experience will be orthogonal to schooling, since wage adjustments will reflect information which is new to the employer.
Thus, the returns to education should not be age dependent. To the extent that the resources of the school each worker attended are observable by employers, one would expect the returns to school spending not to be age dependent either. 7 The survey by Betts (forthcoming) shows that the empirical literature on the effect of school resources on educational attainment is surprisingly small, but overall indicates no or at best small positive effects of school resources on years of schooling. 8 Another source of ambiguity stems from the possibility that those who attended better schools can obtain higher quality training on the job. Again, the effect on the wage profile is uncertain: such workers may obtain more training, meaning that the full effects of school resources manifest themselves only later in the workers' careers, or they obtain less training, so that the differences in the observed returns to education are biggest for younger workers. Hanoch, 1967 . For a thorough review, see also Willis, 1986 .) It is not clear which pattern one should expect in studying the age dependency of the effect of school spending on wages.
Thus, there can be no presumption that the impact of school quality on wages rises as workers gain experience; the question is ultimately an empirical one.
9 Another factor which one might suspect would cause the effects of school inputs on earnings to weaken with the worker's age is depreciation of human capital. However, if the depreciation term and the human capital term interact multiplicatively in the wage function, then the log wage should depend on age and human capital measures such as education with no interaction between them. If there were a more complex non-linear relation between earnings, age and educational attainment then it becomes possible that the effect of school inputs on earnings could decline with the worker's age due to depreciation.
Do School Inputs Predict Forecasted MidCareer Wages or Occupational Status of
Young Workers? Betts (1995) finds that three commonly used measures of school resources (the teacher-pupil ratio, the percentage of teachers with a Master's degree or higher, and the starting salary of inexperienced teachers with a Bachelor's degree relative to average salaries in the given Census region) were not significantly related to earnings of a sample of white male workers from the NLSY. Furthermore, the elasticities were low relative to those reported in the literature which uses state-level measures of school inputs. (See Betts, forthcoming, for a review.)
The paper by Betts (1995) modeled wages of young workers (aged 17-32 at the time of the wage observations) as a function of personal characteristics and resources at the high school attended by the given worker. The subsample dropped workers for whom years of education was missing in any year, or for whom reported years of education declined from one year to the next. It also deleted observations missing any of the regressors used in the basic specification.
To illustrate both the lack of significance of the measures of school resources in the original data, and the lack of age dependence, In order to predict these prime-age earnings, I use the three digit occupation reported by each worker in 1989, the final year for which data were available in the NLSY
subsample. An estimate of earnings was assigned to each of these occupations using data from the sample of white male workers from the 1980 Census, described in the next section. Log weekly wages of all such workers in the Census who were aged 40 to 55 in 1979 were regressed on age, age squared, two dummies for marital status and residence in an SMSA, and 503 dummies for each of the three-digit 1980 Census occupations in the sample. (Based on Hanoch, 1967 , the age range of 40-55 is where the returns to years of schooling are largest.) The coefficients on the occupation dummies were then matched to individuals in the NLSY sample based on the occupation which they held in 1989, when they were 24 to 32 years old. Table 1 presents similar specifications to those in Table A -1, but using predicted earnings of these workers at ages 40-55 as the dependent variable. The dependent variable in these regressions is the aforementioned coefficient on the given occupation dummy from the log weekly wage regression using 1980 Census data. Since these proxies for occupational earnings are measured with varying degrees of error, Table 1 reports results using weighted OLS, with the reciprocal of the square root of the sampling variance for the estimated occupation coefficients used as the weight. As described in the table, the regressions model predicted log weekly wages as a quartic function of experience, a dummy for residence in an SMSA, dummies for residence in eight of the nine Census regions, interactions between those dummies and years of education, and one or more variables intended to proxy for resources at the high school actually attended. For each measure of school resources, the school input is entered on its own, then as an interaction with years of education, and then in both forms simultaneously. The regressions thus replicate the main specifications used in Betts (1995) . Table 1 reveals that in no case do any of the school inputs become statistically significant predictors of estimated mid-career wages of workers at even the 10% level.
In addition, the table reports the elasticity of forecasted earnings with respect to the school input for each specification, along with an estimate of the internal rate of return to spending on each type of input. In order to calculate the internal rate of return, I
assume that a proportional increase in spending per student is made in every school year between kindergarten and Grade 12. To calculate the resulting increase in the discounted value of lifetime earnings, I multiply the predicted percentage wage gain by the discounted value of earnings for the average American male worker between the ages of 19 and 64.
The calculation of present discounted value of earnings uses the actual profile of earnings by age for male American workers, obtained using weighted earnings data from the March 1993 Current Population Survey (CPS) tape. This tape contains information on annual earnings in 1992. The average annual earnings of male workers obtained from the CPS, taken as a simple mean across all ages from 19 to 64, was $22,737.
Next, the elasticity of earnings with respect to each school input must be converted into an elasticity with respect to spending on each input. For teachers' relative salary, this was done by dividing the elasticity of earnings with respect to teacher salary by 0.6, since classroom expenditures, which consist mainly of teachers' salaries, typically account for about 60% of total educational expenditures, with overhead and administrative costs taking up much of the remaining costs. 11 The estimated elasticity of earnings with respect to spending on teachers with Master's degrees assumes that teachers' salaries account for 60% of total educational spending, and that teachers with a Master's degree command a 17% wage premium over teachers who hold only a Bachelor's degree. The latter assumption is based on a log wage regression for teachers which I ran on the March 1993 Current Population Survey. Following Betts (forthcoming), the elasticity of earnings with respect to the teacher-pupil ratio, η, was converted into σ, the elasticity which measures the percentage increase in earnings that results from a given percentage increase in spending aimed at reducing class size, by dividing η by 0.8.
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The estimated internal rates of return to spending on reducing class size or increasing the percentage of teachers with Master's degrees are negative in all cases. In other words, even if one naively weighs the costs of extra school spending today against the future benefits without discounting those benefits, the costs still exceed the benefits.
The results for teacher's relative salary are less clear. Specification #4 shows a negative internal rate of return, while specifications #5 and #6 give internal rates of return of 2.55% and 1.95% respectively. The internal rate of return based on the average elasticity across all three specifications is 1.65%, which is about half of that obtained in state-level studies. For instance, Betts (forthcoming) reports that the average elasticity of earnings with respect to teachers' salary in the state-level literature is 0.1022, which translates into an internal rate of return of 3.65%. While these findings are interesting, they are tempered by the fact that the coefficients are not significant, and by the fact that the specification which is preferred in terms of the adjusted R 2 (#4), suggests that the costs of higher teachers' salaries outweigh the benefits at any positive discount rate. Note also that these estimates may represent an upper bound. Hanoch (1967) found that the returns to years of education were the largest among workers aged roughly 40-55. In the calculations of internal rate of return, I assume that the gain in wages estimated in this age range applies to all ages between 19 and 64.
The overall conclusion from the table is that with the possible exception of teachers' relative salary, one cannot claim that the lack of significance of school inputs in earnings regressions for this sample merely reflects a low level of correlation between the in order to create a new classroom. See Jones (1994) . This is an example of how decreasing class size can increase schools' long-term capital needs.
wages of these workers in their twenties and later in life. These results therefore strengthen the results reached in Betts (1995) . Table 2 searches for positive age dependency in another way. In these regressions, the dependent variable is the slope of the log earnings:age profile obtained from 1980
Census data. 13 In the first stage, log weekly wages for white males aged 25-64 in each occupation in the 1980 Census were regressed on a constant, dummies for marital status and residence in an SMSA, and age. The coefficient on the age variable for each occupation-specific regression was then matched to the occupation held in 1989 by men in the NLSY sample, and these coefficients were regressed on the same variables as in Table   1 . Weighted OLS was again used to account for differences in variances of the first-stage coefficients. The hypothesis to be tested is that the measures of school resources are not correlated with the slope of the wage:age profile. If I find evidence of a positive link, then the impact of additional school spending may manifest itself only as workers age.
14 The results appear in Table 2 . First, the table shows that the slope of the predicted log wage:age profile is steeper for more highly educated workers, as indicated in the work by Hanoch (1967) . But none of the specifications suggest any significant age dependence in the link between earnings growth and either the teacher-pupil ratio or teachers' relative salary. In particular, note that the sign of the teacher relative salary variable is negative, 13 I thank a referee for this suggesting this approach. 14 Note that if the impact of school resources on earnings at the early stages of careers is essentially zero, but if the rate of growth of wages is affected, then this analysis of growth rates of wages should produce highly similar results to those in Table 1 . The main reason why the present approach and the regressions of prime-age earnings in Table 1 might differ substantially is if school resources depress wages of inexperienced workers but also increase the growth rate of wages. In such a case, using the level of wages of prime-age males, rather than the growth rate of wages, would arguably give a more accurate picture of the overall lifecycle impact of school resources on earnings.
contradicting the (statistically insignificant) evidence in Table 1 that the impact of this variable on earnings might increase among older workers. Furthermore, for the percent of teachers with a Master's degree, the regressions reveal a statistically significant negative relation. In other words, the impact of this measure of school of resources on wages appears to weaken as the worker ages, perhaps due to depreciation of human capital.
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As a second measure of the career attainment which the relatively young workers in the NLSY will ultimately attain, the 1970 Census occupation code for each worker in 1989 was matched with the Duncan socioeconomic index score for that occupation.
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Duncan scores were obtained from the NLSY documentation (Attachment 3). Table 3 uses the same specifications as in Table 1 , but instead uses these Duncan socioeconomic index values for the worker's occupation as the independent variable. Ordinary least squares is used due to a lack of information on the sampling variances of the Duncan scores.
On the whole, the school inputs are not strongly related to occupational status.
Nevertheless, it is notable that in two of the three specifications using teachers' relative starting salary, this input becomes significant at 10% or better (and positive in sign).
Model #4, which has the highest adjusted R-squared, suggests that the link between teachers' relative salary and occupational status is negative for students who have twelve or fewer years of schooling, and is positive for those with some college.
15 Similarly, as shown in Table 1 , for the projected earnings of workers 40-55 there is a negative relation between this measure of school resources and earnings, but it is insignificant. 16 I thank Robert Willis for making this suggestion.
Together, the results in these three tables suggest that although school resources do not predict mid-career earnings of workers well, there is some evidence that schools with higher teacher salaries produce students who attain occupations with higher socioeconomic status. Both the specifications in Tables 1 and 2 suggested no significant link between teacher relative salaries and earnings of older workers, though. One rather speculative inference is that the objective function of more highly paid teachers may depend more strongly on the social status of their students after they leave school than on their students' success in a purely economic sense. In contrast, the relation between earnings and the percent of teachers with Master's degrees appears to weaken slightly, if anything, as workers age. In summary, these results do not suggest that the focus on young workers in the school-level literature biases downward the estimated returns to school resources.
Is the Link between State-Level School

Resources and Earnings Age Dependent?
I now consider whether the Census-level literature, which tends to find strong effects of school resources, finds any weakening of the effect among workers in their twenties. I begin by testing for age dependence using 1980 Census data. Of course, in a cross section, cohort and age effects cannot be disentangled. Therefore in Section 4.2 I pool 1970 and 1980 Census data to test for age dependence while controlling for cohort effects.
Tests Based on 1980 Census Data
This section in essence replicates the regressions of Card and Krueger (1992a) with modifications. The most important modifications are that instead of examining workers aged 30-59, this section examines earnings of workers aged 20-59. This provides some overlap with the ages of workers in the NLSY, High School and Beyond and the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, which form the basis of school-level studies such as Altonji (1988) , Betts (1995) and Grogger (1996) . The second important modification is that while Card and Krueger used three age cohorts (ages 30-39, 40-49 and 50-59) this study will use more narrowly defined age cohorts (ages 20-24 through 55-59). In addition to increasing the degrees of freedom, this procedure allows for a more detailed study of the age dependence of the relation between school inputs and earnings. Third, unlike earlier contributions to the state-level literature, this section explicitly tests for age dependence.
This section models log weekly earnings of white males in the 1980 U.S. Census (5% sample). The sample is chosen using the same guidelines as used by Card and Krueger (1992a) . Observations for which age, race, sex, education, weeks worked or total annual earnings were imputed were discarded. Workers whose total wage and salary income in 1979 was less than $101, or whose average weekly wage and salary income was less than $36 or greater than $2500, were deleted. ages 20-24, 25-29, and so on up to 55-59. For each of these cohorts, average school resources by state of birth were assigned in the following way. First, the average of the given school input during the years in which a person of age x would have attended kindergarten through Grade 12 was taken. Next, the mean of these values was taken across all five age groups comprising the given cohort.
A two-step estimation procedure is used. The first stage models the log weekly earnings of white males as follows, where i indexes the person, and b, r, R and c refer to state of birth, state of residence, census region of residence and birth cohort, respectively: 
where the first two sums represent dummies for state of birth and state of residence, and X ibrc is a set of background regressors: years of potential work experience and its square, and two dummies for marital status and residence in an SMSA. As done by Card and Krueger, the γ coefficients added to control for regional returns to education are normalized so that their weighted sum, using the fraction of the population in the given cohort which resides in each region as weights, is zero. The coefficients are estimated by running OLS regressions separately for each cohort.
In the second stage, the estimated coefficients δ bc , which measure the returns to and QUAL bc , the error term ν bc reflects the difference between the actual returns to education and the estimated values, and ε bc is a homoskedastic error term. (In contrast, the weighted OLS procedure used by other authors is equivalent to assuming that var(ε)=0 or that ε is distributed heteroskedastically with a variance proportional to the variance of the corresponding ν bc term.) The error structure in (5-2) can be estimated using GLS based on the method introduced by Borjas (1987) , in which the model is estimated first by OLS, and the variance of ε is estimated as the sum of squared residuals less the sum of estimated variances from each ν bc term, all divided by n-k. In the second stage, the model is re-estimated using the inverse of the square root of var(ε) + var(ν bc ) as the weight for the bc th observation.
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Thus, I pool the estimated returns to education across the 49 states of birth and the 8 cohorts, and model them as a function of one school input at a time, on its own and interacted with age dummies, with the excluded age category being age 55-59. The other regressors are a constant, a set of dummies for state of birth and cohort dummies. Table 4 presents the results.
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The bottom of the table presents p-values for tests that state dummies and the cohort dummies do not belong in the model. In all but a few cases to be discussed later, the restrictions are rejected with probability values below 0.00015.
The only interaction terms which are individually significant at 5% or 10% in the 18 An earlier version of Betts (1995) applies this technique to the data in Card and Krueger (1992a) . The t-statistics on the school input variables fall in most cases, but in only one case does a school input become statistically insignificant. Thus the Card and Krueger results in fact appear to be quite robust to this more general formulation of the error term. 19 In simpler regressions which are not shown, the interactions between the school input and the age dummies are removed. In these regressions the size of the coefficients on the school inputs is similar to those reported by Card and Krueger (1992a) . Signs are as expected, although attendance per teacher and term length are only very weakly significant even in this simple specification, with t-statistics of -1.83 and 1.58 respectively. 20 Note that in regression #4 for term length the test for exclusion of cohort effects strongly retains the null, probably due to collinearity between these effects and the cohort*input interactions. To test for robustness, this model was re-estimated without cohort dummies. All of the input*age interactions were
Simpler models of age dependence were also estimated, in which the 5 interactions between the school input and age dummies were replaced by i) a single interaction between a dummy for workers aged 20-29 and the school input, ii) a single interaction between age and the input, and iii) interactions between the input and a quadratic function of age. All three of these models were estimated by GLS and weighted OLS. In no case did evidence of a weaker effect of school inputs among workers in their twenties emerge.
The only interactions significant at 5% were in the quadratic model of age interacted with attendance per teacher. In this case, the fitted curve suggests that the link between spending on this school input and earnings weakens with age, reaching a minimum at 39.6.
Thus it appears to be workers between the ages of 35 and 44 for whom the effects are weakest. The less restrictive model in Table 4 , column #2, points in the same direction.
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The conclusion from these models is that the link between school inputs and earnings is not age dependent, with the exception that the impact of class size (by either measure) appears to weaken slightly among workers aged between 35 and 44. These findings are robust to the way in which the error term is modeled, to changes in the specification of the age dependence, and to whether state effects are included. In significant and positive, signifying that all age cohorts exhibited bigger returns to term length than did workers aged 55-59. The strongest effects were for workers aged 20-29 and 30-39. Thus the basic conclusion, that the effect does not weaken significantly for workers in their twenties, is retained. 21 The above results were obtained using GLS to account for both sampling variance in the dependent variable and random error in the school quality:earnings link. In order to check the robustness of these results, they were repeated using the simpler weighted OLS procedure. Since the error terms in this specification are more restrictive, one might expect the t-statistics to rise. In the weighted OLS estimates, not shown here, the hypotheses that all the interaction terms between age and the school input were zero, and that the interactions for the two cohorts in their twenties were zero, were strongly retained. 22 As a further test of robustness, the GLS estimates for all of the aforementioned models were repeated without state-of-birth dummies, even though the null that these dummies do not belong in the model was strongly rejected in each case. None of the test statistics in these tests indicated that the impact of school inputs on earnings is age dependent. (Even in the quadratic model for attendance per teacher the p-value rose to 0.12.) particular, the results confirm that the school quality effects are not weaker among worker cohorts in their twenties or early thirties, which have formed the samples for school-level studies such as Grogger (1996) , Betts (1995) , Altonji (1988) and others.
Tests Based on Pooled Census Data from 1970 and 1980
The above section shows that the finding by authors such as Card and Krueger (1992a) given school resource are age dependent, then the estimate of π should be significantly different from 0. Table 5 presents the results from these regressions. The regressions were estimated using weighted OLS, with the square roots of the reciprocal of the sampling variances of the estimated returns to education as weights. 24 Each cell presents the coefficient on the interacted QUAL•CENSUS80 variable and the associated t-statistic from a regression using the stated cohort and school resource. There are only two cases in which this variable becomes significantly different from zero: for the cohort which was aged 40-44 in 1979, both the class size and the attendance per pupil variables become significantly more negative in 1979 than in the earlier decade. However, this finding does not suggest that the school-level studies, which have focused on workers mainly in their twenties, understate the impact of class size, since it suggests only that for this particular cohort the effect of class size on the returns to education was larger for workers in their early forties than when they were in their early thirties. Moreover, these results are highly sensitive to specification changes. When the regressions were re-run without state dummies, both by weighted OLS and by GLS, the t-statistics on class size and attendance per pupil interactions with CENSUS80 fell to the 1.6-1.85 range.
25 24 The GLS procedure produced several observations with negative weights, apparently because the inclusion of state fixed effects greatly reduced the sum of squared residuals. The table presents the results with state fixed effects included, though, because in every case the hypothesis that the state dummies were jointly zero was rejected with a p-value of 0.01 or less. 25 Similarly, running the regressions for all other cohorts and school resources without state dummies, using either weighted OLS or GLS, tended to reduce the t-statistics. In particular, in the two cases in Table 9 where a t-statistic was between 1.5 and 1.9, the alternative specifications produced t-statistics in the neighborhood of 1-1.1.
A weakness of the above approach is that by running separate regressions for each cohort, it reduces efficiency. An alternative approach is to pool the data for all 6 cohorts.
This extension is useful because, for instance, I have two cohorts who are aged 30-34 in one of the two Census years, and two cohorts who are aged 40-44 in one of the two years. I can thus test the robustness of the results from Table 5 that, for at least one cohort, the impact of class size or attendance per pupil strengthened as that particular cohort aged from 30-34 to 40-44. The results below show that these findings are unrobust: they appear to be related to one cohort and not to the population in general.
Using the same notation as in Section 4.1, the basic specification used was: for an explicit test of the hypothesis that the observed link between the returns to education and school inputs is identical for workers in their twenties and older workers.
As before the two error terms account for sampling error in estimating the returns to education in the first stage as well as the stochastic error in the second stage model. Tables 6 through 9 present the results for this and more complex specifications.
Column #1 omits any interactions between school inputs and age. Column #2 adds the interaction between the school input and a dummy for workers who were in their twenties.
This is the key test for whether the measured effect of school inputs is weaker for younger workers. In no case does this variable become significant at even 10%.
The remaining columns in the tables test more generally for age dependence, using a linear interaction between mean age of the cohort and the school input (column #3), a quadratic interaction (column #4) and in column #5 six age dummies interacted with the school input. 26 The results show no significant pattern in most specifications. The only hint of age dependence comes in the models of teachers' relative salary, where the linear age interaction is positive and significant at 10%. The semi-parametric model in column #5 suggests that this pattern reflects a negative interaction between this input and the dummy for workers aged 20-24, which is significant at less than 10%. However, as
shown by the third row from the bottom in the table, the F-test that the effect of teachers' salaries is identical for workers under age 30 is retained with a p-value of 0.1406.
Various robustness checks were performed. The models were re-estimated using the more restrictive weighted OLS formulation. The conclusions were identical to those sketched above, except that the relative salary variables were slightly less significant in this specification. Second, the GLS models were re-estimated without state dummies. The results of these respecified models were also similar to those above. The only important change was that in model #5 for teachers' salary, the t-statistic on the interaction between teachers' salary and the dummy for workers aged 20-24 fell from -1.86 to -1.52.
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As another check of robustness of the pooled regressions in Table 6 -9, the pooled model was re-estimated by taking first differences, so that the dependent variable becomes the change in the returns to education for a given cohort-(state-of-birth) combination. (An advantage of this method is that the estimator sweeps out any factors which are constant for each cohort, even if they are unobserved.) This model was estimated by GLS, using the sum of the variances of the estimated returns to education in 1970 and 1980 as the measure of the variance of the dependent variable. 28 Table 10 presents the results. All regressors except those shown drop out in the first-differenced model. In each case, the coefficient on the interaction between the school input and the dummy for workers under 30 remains insignificant. The coefficients are also highly similar to those obtained in the levels regressions in Tables 6 through 9 , which is reassuring if one thinks of the firstdifferenced models as providing a robustness test of the models in levels. Thus Census data reveal little if any age dependence of school inputs on earnings.
Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to test the hypothesis that the disparity between the state-level and school-level studies of school quality stems from age dependence in the relationship between school resources and subsequent earnings of students. The schoollevel studies, which find little or no link between school resources and earnings, examine workers under the age of 32 for the most part, while all state-level studies examine workers who are mostly if not all over thirty years old.
The paper develops a model which establishes that the impact of school quality on earnings may rise or fall with the worker's age, mainly due to the fact that higher school quality raises both the marginal costs to and benefits from additional training. Thus there can be no a priori presumption that the effects of school spending increase with the worker's age.
The paper tests the age dependence hypothesis using both NLSY and Census data.
Data from the NLSY were analyzed for age dependence in four ways. First, log wage regressions using a subsample of workers aged 25-32 (as opposed to 17-32) suggested no age dependency. The other three methods of testing for age dependency use predicted mid-career wages, predicted wage growth or occupational status of these workers as the dependent variables. Each of these three variables is modeled as a function of personal traits and school resources. In no case do any of the three measures of school resources become significantly linked to predicted mid-career earnings, or earnings growth, at even the ten percent level. The only exception is that the slope of the wage:experience profile is estimated to be significantly lower for workers who attended schools with a larger proportion of teachers with Master's degrees. This suggests that the school-level studies should, if anything, overstate the impact of this school resource on wages. Furthermore, in the case of teachers' education and the teacher-pupil ratio, the elasticities suggest that additional spending on these inputs would produce a negative return at any positive rate of discount.
29 29 In two specifications, the internal rate of return to spending on teacher's relative salary becomes positive, and about one half as large as found in the state-level literature. But the effect is not statistically significant. Furthermore, a third specification, which has a higher adjusted R 2 , suggested a negative internal rate of return. There is also evidence that for workers who obtain some postsecondary education Thus in terms of statistical significance, the results suggest that the age dependence hypothesis is incorrect. There is some evidence in favor of a rising effect of teachers' relative salary on students' earnings as the students become older, but the results are statistically insignificant, and are not robust to changes in specification.
The second approach to testing the age dependence hypothesis was to extend the earlier literature which has linked workers' earnings from Census data to school resources in the workers' state of birth by examining younger workers, and by explicitly testing that the impact of school resources on earnings is weaker among workers under thirty. Many different specifications using both 1980 Census data and pooled 1970 and 1980 Census data were estimated. The hypothesis that there is no significant difference between the measured impact of school resources and earnings of workers in their twenties and older workers was easily retained for all four measures of school quality (class size, attendance per teacher, teachers' relative salaries and term length.) A few specifications provided some evidence that the impact of teachers' relative salary on earnings of workers was significantly weaker for workers aged 20-24, but it was not significantly weaker for workers aged 20-29 taken as a whole. Thus researchers should exercise caution when calculating the returns to increasing teachers' salaries, since there is weak evidence that it might take some time for these benefits to accrue. This age dependence, if it exists, will reduce the internal rate of return to increasing spending on teachers' salaries.
there is a positive link between teachers' relative salary and the status of their own occupation, while there is a negative link for workers with a high school diploma or less.
For the other variables --class size, attendance per teacher, and term length --no specification or sample suggested a significantly weaker effect for workers in their twenties.
In summary, the paper suggests that age dependence is not the main explanation for the divergent results in the literature on the link between school resources and earnings.
30 Taken 1987 0.1987 0.1987 0.1998 0.1986 0.1982 0.1979 0.1976 0.1977 Note: The dependent variable is the coefficient on the relevant occupation dummy from a log wage regression using 1980 Census data. Other regressors not shown are a constant, dummies for marital status, residence in an SMSA, a quartic function of experience, Census region dummies and interactions between these dummies and years of education. Number of workers is 1143. Estimated internal rates of return are calculated to within 0.05%. Tstatistics appear in parentheses. Note: The dependent variable is the coefficient on the age variable in a log wage regression using 1980 Census data for white men in the given occupation. Other regressors not shown are a constant, dummies for marital status, residence in an SMSA, a quartic function of experience, Census region dummies and interactions between these dummies and years of education. Number of workers is 1143. T-statistics appear in parentheses. Note: The dependent variable is the natural log of weekly earnings. Other regressors not shown are a constant, years of education, dummy variables for marital status and residence in an SMSA, region dummies, region dummies interacted with education, and a quartic function of experience. T-statistics appear in parentheses.
